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“U Can’t Touch This” Fog Line: the Improper
Use of a Fog Line Violation as a Pretext for
Initiating an Unlawful Fourth Amendment
Search and Seizure
1

BY HARVEY GEE2
Fog line litigation is happening all across the country. For years, law
enforcement officers across the country have been initiating traffic stops of
cars on our roadways, based on allegations that the drivers crossed onto a
fog line in violation of a state ordinance prohibiting such conduct. A fog
line is the white line that divides the shoulder from the road. While the legislative history and language of these fog line statutes reflect their public
safety purpose, the police are relying on statutes as an excuse to pull over
cars which may have only momentarily crossed the fog line and where the
drivers have done nothing else unlawful. This common practice affords
police tremendous leeway to conduct pretextual stops, unreasonably detain
suspects, and unlawfully search vehicles. More often than not, in fog line
cases, even if the court holds that the defendant did not violate a state traffic law, the government will nevertheless argue that the traffic stop was
valid because the officer’s mistake of law was reasonable, and there was
reasonable suspicion or probable cause to initiate the traffic stop. This Essay explores the mistakes of law committed by police officers during traffic
stops, and argues that the police should not be allowed to use alleged fog
line violations as a pretext for initiating a traffic stop if it cannot be supported by reasonable suspicion or probable cause. Such an unreasonable
stop violates the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Unbeknownst to most people, fog line litigation is happening all across
the country. For years, law enforcement officers across the country have
been initiating traffic stops of cars on our roadways, based on allegations
that the drivers crossed onto a fog line in violation of a state ordinance prohibiting such conduct. A fog line is “the white line that demarcates the
shoulder from the road.”3 There can be foot long ruts created in the roadway within inches of the fog lines designed to alert wayward drivers who
traverse beyond the fog line. While the legislative history and language of
these statutes reflect their public safety purpose, the police are relying on
statutes as an excuse to pull over cars which may have only momentarily
crossed the fog line and where the drivers have done nothing else unlawful.
To be sure, this common practice affords police tremendous leeway to
conduct pretextual stops, unreasonably detain suspects, and unlawfully
search vehicles. These dubious practices are highlighted in Professor Melanie Wilson’s study of the practice in Kansas wherein the police continually
relied upon professed fog lane violations as a pretext to target immigrant
Hispanic drivers.4 She argues that “[b]ecause fog-line violations are easy to
believe and difficult to refute, unscrupulous officers might be tempted to
adopt them as a favorite explanation for traffic stops, particularly when they

3. Riche v. Director of Revenue, 987 S.W.2d 331, 333 (Mo. 1999) (en banc).
4. See Melanie D. Wilson, “You Crossed the Fog Line!”—Kansas, Pretext, and
the Fourth Amendment, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 1179, 1191 (2010).
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do not have other reasonable grounds to believe that the car’s occupants are
committing a crime.”5
Upon challenge at the judicial level, state and federal courts have taken divergent approaches in their analyses of fog line traffic stops. This is
most evident in the Eighth Circuit where there has been a split in state and
legal authority.6 Specifically, Missouri state court decisions have consistently ruled in favor of defendants who were stopped based on alleged fog
lane violations, whereas the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has more often
sided with law enforcement in finding that officers are allowed to make
reasonable mistakes of law.7 The Ninth Circuit has for the most part uniformly and consistently held that a minor, isolated crossing of a lane line
does not constitute a failure to maintain a travel lane. In United States v.
Colin,8 the Ninth Circuit analyzed California’s lane statute,9 which requires
that drivers “drive as nearly as practical entirely within a single lane.”10
Colin was accused of twice driving in the fog lane for a prolonged period of
time.11 The officers in Colin pulled the car over for a possible violation of
driving under the influence and lane straddling, after seeing a car drift to the
right, and its right tires follow the fog line for about ten seconds.12 The
Ninth Circuit held that the officers lacked justification for a traffic stop because the weaving was not pronounced and did not continue over a “substantial distance.”13 Accordingly, the court found the officer did not have
reasonable suspicion to effectuate a stop.14
Likewise, in United States v. Delgado-Hernandez,15 the Ninth Circuit
held that defendant’s crossing over of a fog line momentarily did not violate
a Nevada statute governing driving on a highway having multiple marked
lanes for traffic, as required to afford officers reasonable suspicion to effec5. Id.
6. See Charity Whitney, Missouri’s Foggy Fog Line Law, 77 MO. L. REV. 303,
303-305 (2012).
7. Id.
8. United States v. Colin, 314 F.3d 439, 446 (9th Cir. 2002).
9.
Whenever any roadway has been divided into two or more clearly
marked lanes for traffic in one direction, the following rules apply: (a) A
vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practical entirely within a single lane
and shall not be moved from the lane until such movement can be made
with reasonable safety.
CAL. VEH. CODE § 21658(a) (1976).
10. See United States v. Colin, 314 F.3d 439, 444 (9th Cir. 2002).
11. Id.
12. Id. at 441.
13. Id. at 445-46.
14. Id.
15. United States v. Delgado-Hernandez, No. 06-10572, 2008 WL 2485429 (9th
Cir. June 19, 2008).
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tuate traffic stops, as the purpose of the statute was to promote safety and
defendant’s conduct did not endanger anyone. But in United States v.
Raileanu,16 the district court concluded that Raileanu violated Nevada Revised Statute 484.223 (“NRS 484.223”) when he crossed over the fog lane
three times in one-quarter of a mile. More recently, that same court in
United States v. Wendfeldt17 granted a habeas petition based on the Nevada
Highway Patrol’s unconstitutional stop of a car traveling on Interstate 80
based on an alleged violation of NRS 484.305 (the predecessor statute to
NRS 484.223).18
More often than not, in fog line cases, even if the court holds that the
defendant did not violate a state traffic law, the government will nevertheless argue that the traffic stop was valid because the officer’s mistake of
law was reasonable, and there was reasonable suspicion or probable cause
to initiate the traffic stop. Significantly, under the Supreme Court’s ruling
last term in Heien v. North Carolina,19 officers are allowed to make a reasonable mistake of law. But discretion remains with the lower courts because Heien involved an unusual and ambiguously worded North Carolina
statute. Thus, Heien does not affect the analysis in this Essay because most
of the state statutes governing fog lane infractions, such as the statutes in
California and Nevada, are not at all ambiguous and can be reasonably understood by citizens and police alike.
As a counterweight to Heien, Rodriguez v. United States,20 was the
Court’s second significant criminal decision last term. Rodriguez imposes a
time limit on the traffic stop—they have to be reasonably short, unless there
is reasonable suspicion of some other crime.21 Thus, officers cannot prolong
a traffic stop just to perform a dog sniffing drug search.22
Against this backdrop, this Essay explores the mistakes of law committed by police officers during traffic stops, and argues that the police
should not be allowed to use alleged fog line violations as a pretext for initiating a traffic stop if it cannot be supported by reasonable suspicion or
probable cause. Such an unreasonable stop violates the Fourth Amendment
to the U.S. Constitution. This Essay is divided into five parts. Part two
summarizes the relevant Fourth Amendment search and seizure case law as
it applies to traffic stops. Part three analyzes Heien23 and Rodriguez.24 Part
16. United States v. Raileanu, No. 2:13-CR-038-APG-PAL, 2013 WL 6913252, at
*2 (D. Nev. Dec. 30, 2013).
17. United States v. Wendfeldt, 58 F. Supp. 3d 1124 (D. Nev. 2014).
18. Id. at 1136.
19. Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530 (2014).
20. Rodriguez v. United States, No. 13-9972, 2015 WL 1780927 (April 21, 2015).
21. Id. at *3.
22. Id.
23. Heien, 135 S. Ct. 530.
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four discusses the Ninth Circuit’s recent jurisprudence on this issue. This
section especially focuses on Raileanu,25 which I believe is an especially
egregious example of the use of Nevada’s fog lane statute as a pretext for
an unlawful search of Raileanu’s car by the police. His conviction eventually led to his deportation from this country. Raileanu is also a deviation from
other fog lane cases in the Ninth Circuit. This section also argues for the
exclusion of evidence that results from a police officer’s mistake of law
during a traffic stop. This section concludes with a survey of other opinions
from other jurisdictions. Part five explores the racial and immigration implications of traffic stops, and suggests that racial minorities and immigrants are especially vulnerable when they are stopped for an alleged fog
line violation. This section also provides a brief overview of racial profiling
and the interplay between the deportations of undocumented immigrants.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Fourth Amendment proscribes violations of “[t]he right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures . . . .”26 In order to challenge a search or
seizure as a violation of the Fourth Amendment, a person must have had a
subjective expectation of privacy in the place or property to be searched
which was objectively reasonable.27
A search incident to a lawful arrest is one of the few exceptions to the
general rule that “searches conducted outside the judicial process without
prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment . . . .”28 The protections of the Fourth Amendment extend to brief investigatory stops of persons or vehicles that fall short of traditional arrest.29 Accordingly, the Fourth Amendment requires that such
seizures be, at a minimum, “reasonable.”30 To satisfy the Fourth Amendment, an investigatory stop may be made only if the officer has “a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity ʻmay be
afoot’ . . . .”31 “[A] Fourth Amendment violation occurs when the detention
extends beyond the valid reason for the stop. . . . Once a computer check is
24. Rodriquez, 2015 WL 1780927.
25. United States v. Raileanu, No. 2:13-CR-038-APG-PAL, 2013 WL 6913252, at *
2 (D. Nev. Dec. 30, 2013)
26. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
27. Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 95-96 (1990).
28. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
29. See United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989); United States v. BrignoniPonce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968).
30. Brigoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 878.
31. Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7; accord United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d
1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2000).
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completed and the officer either issues a citation or determines that no citation should be issued, the detention should end and the driver should be free
to leave.”32 Evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment cannot be used in a criminal proceeding against the victim of the illegal search
and seizure.33 This includes the “fruit” of such illegal conduct.34 If an individual can establish that the initial stop of a car violated the Fourth
Amendment, then the evidence that was seized as a result of that stop would
be subject to suppression as “fruit of the poisonous tree.”35 The government
has the burden to show that the evidence is not a “fruit of the poisonous
tree.”36
III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
A. HEIEN V. NORTH CAROLINA
Leading up to Heien, a generation of mistake of law litigation created
a split between the circuits. Analyses of mistake of law for traffic stops
have culminated in confusing and inconsistent judicial decisions. Lower
courts are deeply divided on the question of, what if an officer pulls over a
car based on his belief that a violation has occurred but it turns out that the
officers erroneously interpreted the law? A majority of courts do not allow
officers to make a mistake of law when executing a traffic stop, and instead
hold that it is a violation of the Fourth Amendment, rendering inadmissible
any evidence resulting from that stop.37 Conversely, a minority of courts,
led by the Eighth Circuit, hold the opposite as long as the mistake was reasonable under the circumstances.38 The Court in Heien purportedly answered the issue. However, as detailed below, the case involved an unusually ambiguous statute, and provided little guidance to lower courts.

ted).

32.

United States v. Santiago, 310 F.3d 336, 341-42 (5th Cir. 2002) (citations omit-

33. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654 (1961).
34. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-88 (1963) (Evidence obtained as
fruit of an illegal search or seizure may not be used against defendant.).
35. United States v. Twilley, 222 F.3d 1092, 1095 (9th Cir. 2000).
36. Id. at 1097.
37. See United States v. Gross, 550 F.3d 578, 584 (6th Cir. 2008); United States v.
McDonald, 453 F.3d 958 (7th Cir. 2008); United States v. Tibbetts, 396 F.3d 1132 (10th Cir.
2005); United States v. De Gasso, 369 F.3d, 1139, 1144 (10th Cir. 2004); United States v.
Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271 (11th Cir. 2003); United States v. King, 224 F.3d 736, 741
(9th Cir. 2001); United States v. Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d 1101 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v.
Miller, 146 F.3d 274 (5th Cir. 1998).
38. See United States v. Smart, 393 F.3d 767, 770 (8th Cir. 2005); Johnson v.
Crooks, 326 F.3d 995, 998 (8th Cir. 2003).
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1. Factual Background
A North Carolina officer observing northbound traffic on Interstate 77
noticed a Ford Escort with a driver who appeared “very stiff and nervous.”39 While following this “suspicious” car, the officer noticed that only
one of the brake lights was functioning and pulled the driver over.40 After
clearing the driver’s license and registration through dispatch, the officer
was in the process of issuing a warning ticket when he became suspicious
about the two occupants’ answers to his questions.41 According to the officer, they appeared nervous and gave inconsistent answers about their destination.42 When the men were asked if they were transporting contraband,
the men responded in the negative, but eventually gave consent to a
search.43 A sandwich bag containing cocaine was found in the side pocket
of a duffle bag. Heien was charged with attempted trafficking in cocaine.44
The trial court denied Heien’s suppression motion and determined that the
faulty brake light supported reasonable suspicion for the stop.45 At the heart
of the controversy was the North Carolina statute,46 a confusingly written
statute that had never been authoritatively construed by the legislature or
the courts.
Upon appeal, the North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed holding
that the relevant code provision, which requires that a car be “equipped
with a stop lamp . . .”47 and requires only a single lamp, which Heien’s vehicle had, and thus the justification for the stop was objectively unreasonable.48 However, the State Supreme Court reversed the lower court on the
basis that even though no law was violated, the officer’s mistaken understanding of the law was reasonable. The Supreme Court agreed and ruled
eight to one that there was no Fourth Amendment violation because it was
objectively reasonable for the officer to think that Heien’s faulty right brake
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 534 (2014).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 535.
Id.

The statute provides in pertinent part that a car must be:
equipped with a stop lamp on the rear of the vehicle. The stop lamp shall
display a red or amber light visible from a distance of not less than 100
feet to the rear in normal sunlight, and shall be actuated upon application
of the service (foot) brake. The stop lamp may be incorporated into a
unit with one or more other rear lamps.
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 20-129(g) (West 2007).
47. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 20-129(g) (West 2007).
48. Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 540 (2014).
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light was a violation of North Carolina law, and therefore, reasonable suspicion existed to effectuate the traffic stop.49
2. Majority Opinion
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts held that reasonable
suspicion, as required for a traffic stop or an investigatory stop, can rest on
a reasonable mistake of law in stopping a vehicle for which one of the brake
lights was working.50 Roberts reasoned that “[r]easonable men make mistakes of law . . .” and reasonable mistakes of fact, and mistake of law and
mistakes of fact should be treated similarly under the law.51 In doing so, he
rejected Heien’s broad arguments that (1) the court should focus solely on
the question of mistake of law;52 and (2) if ignorance of the law is no excuse for average people, then it should not be an excuse for police either.53
Instead, Justice Roberts gave deferrence to what he viewed as the challenge
facing officers making quick judgments in the fields.54
In neutralizing Heien’s argument about the fundamental unfairness of
allowing police officers to escape liability based on mistakes when citizens
are not afforded to do so under the mistake of fact, the majority relies on
Michigan v. DeFillippo,55 which involved the arrest of an apparently intoxicated DeFillippo when he failed to identify himself.56 This contravened a
Detroit ordinance that authorized the police to charge any individual who
refused to identify himself and provide evidence of his identity.57 Drugs
were found incident to arrest. Later, the Michigan Court of Appeals held
that the identification ordinance was constitutionally invalid.58 Despite this
fact, the Supreme Court held that DeFillippo’s arrest was valid because the
search itself was constitutional given that the police had probable cause.59
Roberts stressed “[j]ust as an individual generally cannot escape criminal liability based on a mistaken understanding of the law, so too the government cannot impose criminal liability based on a mistaken understanding of the law. . . .” and then argued that “just because mistakes of law can-

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id.
Id. at 534.
Id. at 536.
Id. at 539.
Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 539.
Id.
Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979).
Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 538-39.
DeFillippo, 443 U.S. at 33.
Id.
Heien,, 135 S. Ct. at 538..
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not justify either the imposition or the avoidance of criminal liability, it
does not follow that they cannot justify an investigatory stop.”60
Roberts further reasoned that mistakes of law can also be allowed for
reasonable suspicion because reasonable suspicion stems from the officer’s
combined understanding of both the facts and the relevant law.61 Here, he
acknowledged that reasonableness does not mean correctness all the time,
yet the police should still be given some leeway to enforce the law in the
name of public safety.62 Following up, Roberts provided examples of reasonable mistakes by law enforcement in executing searches and seizures
and in erroneously arresting the wrong suspect based on a suspect’s description alone.63
While the majority opinion empowers law enforcement with greater
authority, Roberts minimizes this fact by only mentioning how advantageous the Court’s ruling is to the police when he writes, “our decision does
not discourage officers from learning the law . . . an officer can gain no
Fourth Amendment advantage through a sloppy study of the laws he is duty-bound to enforce.”64
On the whole, the Heien analysis is centered on a doctrinal analysis of
mistake of law that obscures the realities of law enforcement practices, including the common practices of the police in finding any excuse to follow
and pull drivers over for alleged traffic violations, detecting “suspicious
behavior” during the dialogue between the officer and driver about their
vehicle registration, and other small talk about traveling destination. Heien
is not as sweeping as Whren v. United States,65 which allows a traffic violation alone to justifiy a stop. Still, the police may sometimes abuse the authority granted by Whren when they lack any legal justification for initiating a traffic stop.66 In such cases, the Government may claim that the subjective intentions of the police are irrelevant in “ordinary, probable-cause
Fourth Amendment analysis” under Whren.67 While that is true, there must

60. Id. at 540.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 536.
64. Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 539-40.
65. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996).
66. See David A. Harris, “Driving While Black” and All Other Traffic Offenses:
The Supreme Court and Pretextual Traffic Stops, in THE FOURTH AMENDMENT SEARCHES
AND SEIZURES: ITS CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY AND THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATE 166 (Cynthia Lee ed., 2011) (arguing that “police will use the immense discretionary power Whren
gives them mostly to stop African-Americans and Hispanics. . . . [W]hatever their motivation, viewed as a whole, pretextual stops will be used against African-Americans and Hispanics in percentages wildly out of proportion to their numbers in the driving population.”).
67. Whren, 517 U.S. at 813.
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still be objective circumstances to justify the stop.68 Interestingly, the majority opinion only mentions Whren v. United States69 once, when Justice
Roberts offers that the court “do[es] not examine the subjective understanding of the particular officer involved.”70 Nevertheless, after Heien, if the
officers rely on reasonable mistakes of law, then the courts will allow the
stops.
3. Concurring Opinion
In a concurring opinion, Justice Kagan, joined by Justice Ginsburg,
seemingly offered more explicit guidance to the lower courts than the majority opinion by acknowledging the ambiguity of the North Carolina law,
and declared that an officer’s “subjective understanding” of the law is irrelevant.71 Justice Kagan stressed the difficulties of interpreting the North
Carolina statute, which can be reasonably construed as defining a brake
light as not a rear lamp (as the North Carolina Court of Appeals held), or it
allows an officer to consider a brake light as a rear lamp.72 She noted that
the statute was difficult to interpret and the officer acted reasonably in his
interpretation.73 Moreover, Kagan narrowly read the Heien standard, and
forewarned that in future cases much will depend on the statute itself. She
noted “[i]f the statute is genuinely ambiguous, such that overturning the
officer’s judgment requires hard interpretive work, then the officer has
made a reasonable mistake.”74 Kagan also emphasized that the government
cannot defend an officer’s mistaken legal interpretation on the ground that
the officer was unaware or untrained in the law since such considerations
involve merely the officer’s subjective understanding of the law.75
4. Dissenting Opinion
Justice Sotomayor began her strong dissent with a discussion of reasonableness, and highlighted the deference given to officers who evaluate,
often quickly, the significance of facts out in the field.76 But unlike the view
of the majority, Justice Sotomayor argued that this same amount of defer68. See United States v. Wallace, 213 F.3d 1216, 1219 (9th Cir. 2000) (“The fact
that the alleged traffic violation is a pretext for the stop is irrelevant, so long as the objective
circumstances justify the stop.”).
69. Whren, 517 U.S. at 813.
70. Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 539 (2014).
71. Id. at 541.
72. Id. at 542.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 541.
75. Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 541 (2014).
76. Id. at 543.
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ence is not applicable to an officer’s interpretation of laws, which is better
left to courts.77 Compared to the majority opinion, Whren is given more
attention by Justice Sotomayor in her dissent when she elaborates on the
expanded authority given to the police by the majority to expand on the
opinion when they are policing in the “real world.”78 Justice Sotomayor is
also much more sympathetic to situations where a citizen is arrested based
on a legal ambiguity.79 This is apparent in her remark decrying the majority’s “eroding [of] the Fourth Amendment’s protection of civil liberties . . .”
and points out “the meaning of the law is not probabilistic in the same way
that factual determinations are.”80 Rather, “ʻthe notion that the law is definite and knowable’ sits at the foundation of our legal system.”81
From Sotomayor’s point of view, the police would not be “unduly
hampered” in the majority circuits that have held that police mistakes of
law are not a factor in the reasonableness inquiry.82 She highlighted the
fundamental unfairness in holding that a reasonable mistake of law can
justify a Fourth Amendment seizure.83 “[T]here is nothing in our case law
requiring us to hold that a reasonable mistake of law can justify a seizure
under the Fourth Amendment.”84 She argued this would result in too many
stops, resulting in constitutional violations because innocent citizens would
be made to shoulder the burden. Justice Sotomayor asserted that an officer
should be held accountable because it is their job to make split-second decisions.85 Justice Sotomayor argued “an officer’s mistake of law, no matter
how reasonable, cannot support the individualized suspicion necessary to
justify a seizure under the Fourth Amendment.”86
Next, Sotomayor noted the “police stopped Heien on suspicion of
committing an offense that never actually existed.”87 This was not a reasonable mistake about the facts on the ground—it was a mistake of law made
by the police, the very same government officials whose central duty is the
proper enforcement of the law.88
Further, Sotomayor discusses another practical problem with the majority opinion: that it will have “the perverse effect of preventing or delaying the clarification of the law” by lower courts, which in deciding motions
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id.
Id. at 539.
Id. at 546.
Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 546 (2014).
Id.
Id. at 544.
Id. at 545.
Id.
Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 546 (2014).
Id. at 547.
Id. at 546.
Id. at 547.
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to suppress will no longer need to offer a definitive interpretation of the
law, but rather will need only to decide whether the officer’s interpretation
of the law was a “reasonable” one.89 Justice Sotomayor writes, “[t]his result
is bad for citizens, who need to know their rights and responsibilities, and it
is bad for police, who would benefit from clearer direction.”90
Here, Sotomayor’s analysis is most persuasive since Heien flies in the
face of the age-old principle that knowledge of the law is imputed to the
general public and that “ignorance of the law is no excuse.”91 As was echoed throughout the dissent, the making of decisions and taking action in the
field by the police is part of their job. Given the great leeway that the police
already had before Heien it would not be overly burdensome for them to be
held to be accountable for their actions, just like the other citizens. Because
reasonable mistake of facts by citizens is no defense,92 neither should mistake of law by officers be used to exonerate them from liability in an otherwise lawful traffic stop. In the end, though Heien is favorable to police
conduct in regards to mistakes of law, the mistakes still need to be “objectively reasonable.” As such, officers still need to understand the law and
cannot rely on their subjective understanding of the law.
B. RODRIGUEZ V. UNITED STATES
Under Rodriguez v. United States,93 officers cannot prolong a traffic
stop just to perform a dog sniffing drug search.94 As such, Rodriguez may
deter officers inclined to use their authority to intimidate citizens out of
exercising their constitutional rights.
Rodriguez’s Mercury Mountaineer was spotted on a Nebraska highway veering slowly onto the shoulder for one or two seconds and then jerking back onto the road. Nebraska law prohibits driving on highway shoulders.95 A K-9 officer questioned Rodriguez and checked his license, registration, and whether he had an outstanding arrest warrant. Everything
checked out, but the officers also questioned the passenger traveling with
Rodriguez and checked his documents as well.96 Twenty minutes after the
89. Id.
90. Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 547 (2014).
91. Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 195 (1998) (“ignorance of the law is no
excuse” for criminal conduct).
92. See Gabriel Chin et al., The Mistake of Law Defense and an Unconstitutional
Provision of the Model Penal Code, 93 N.C. L. REV. 139, 144 (2014) (“At [C]ommon [L]aw,
both historically and today, a personal misunderstanding or ignorance of the law is generally
not a defense to a criminal prosecution.”).
93. Rodriguez v. United States, No. 13-9972, 2015 WL 1780927 (April 21, 2015).
94. Id. at *3.
95. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 60-6, 142 (2010).
96. Rodriguez, 2015 WL 1780927 at *3.
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stop began, the officer issued a warning but did not let the men leave. Instead, the officer asked if the dog could conduct a walk around the car.
Rodriguez said “no.”97 He was then detained eight minutes until another
officer arrived. The dog sniff was then conducted; the dog alerted and police found a bag of methamphetamines.98 Seven or eight minutes elapsed
from the time the officer issued the written warning until the dog alerted.99
Rodriguez was indicted on federal drug charges.100 He moved to suppress the evidence seized from the vehicle. The Magistrate Judge recommended denial of the motion based on his conclusion that the “extension of
the stop by ʻseven to eight minutes’ for the dog sniff was only a de minimis
intrusion on Rodriguez’s Fourth Amendment rights and was therefore permissible,” and the district court adopted that recommendation.101 Rodriguez
was convicted upon his conditional guilty plea to one count of possession
with intent to distribute fifty grams or more of methamphetamine, and appealed the denial of his motion to suppress on the ground that the officer
had prolonged the traffic stop without reasonable suspicion in order to conduct the dog sniff.102 The Eighth Circuit affirmed.103
Writing for a six justice majority, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg applied
a safety-based rationale for traffic stops, and explained that the fundamental
mission of a traffic stop is “ensuring that vehicles on the road are operated
safely and responsibly.”104 This principle allows the officers to inquire into
the traffic violation that justified the stop, as well as to make other safetyrelated checks. The police may check for a driver’s license, ask for a registration and proof of insurance and check for outstanding warrants. But exceeding the time needed to handle the matter for which the stop was made
violates the Constitution’s shield against unreasonable seizures.105 The
Court concluded that bringing out drug sniffing dogs is outside the mission
and cannot support a delay absent reasonable suspicion. Ginsburg stressed
that the traffic stop “ʻbecome[s] unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time
reasonably required to complete th[e] mission’ of issuing a warning ticket .
. . .”106 Justice Ginsburg reasoned,
Unlike a general interest in criminal enforcement, however,
the government’s officer safety interest stems from the
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id.
Rodriguez, 2015 WL 1780927 at *4.
Id. at *4.
Id. at *1.
Id. at *4.
Id.
Rodriguez, 2015 WL 1780927 at *4.
Id. at *6.
Id. at *3.
Id. at *3 (citations omitted).
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mission of the stop itself. . . . On-scene investigation into
other crimes, however, detours from that mission. . . . So
too do safety precautions taken in order to facilitate such
detours. . . . Thus, even assuming that the imposition here
was no more intrusive than the exit order in Mimms, the
dog sniff could not be justified on the same basis.107
The Court remanded the case to the lower court to determine whether,
despite the magistrate’s finding to the contrary, there was some reasonable,
independent justification for the search. Justice Kennedy filed a dissent.
Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Alito joined and
Justice Kennedy joined in part.
Doctrinally, Rodriguez imposes limits by adopting a more limited
framework for the duration of the stop and says that the criminal-related
steps cannot extend the stop even a second beyond that. While the ruling
does not completely erase Heien because officers can still stop cars even if
they are mistaken about the law, once they do, they cannot detain cars
without reasonable suspicion that a crime has been committed.
As analyzed in the next section, an alleged traffic infraction of crossing or touching a fog line is at best the sport of “sloppy study” referred to
by Chief Justice Roberts in Heien. To hold otherwise ignores the observations by both the majority opinion and dissenting opinions in Heien that it
would be a rare situation where the law is so confusing that it would be
reasonable for a police officer to be unaware of it. Such a holding would
also mean that ignorance of the plain language used in the law automatically excuses the police.
IV. FOG LINE LITIGATION
Remarkably, the practical problems of the majority opinion, especially
its placing a reliance and trust on an officer, which concerned Justice Sotomayor, are realized in a generation of fog line litigation. Unfortunately, in
many of these fog line cases, law enforcement seems to be relying on fog
line violations as a pretext to effectuate traffic stops, irrespective of the
officer’s interpretation of law. Unlike the statute in Heien that involved a
difficult issue of statutory interpretation well outside the ken of non-lawyer
police officers, state fog line statutes are not difficult to learn about and
understand. Thus, it is unlikely that an objectively reasonable officer could
sensibly misinterpret, in good faith, these fog line statutes.
The majority of authority on this issue supports the supposition that
nominally encroaching upon traffic control lines does not constitute a viola107.

Id. at *7 (citations omitted).
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tion of safely maintaining one’s travel lane. To begin, in Rowe v. State,108
the unanimous court examined the plain language of Maryland’s lanestraddling statute and concluded that, “more than the integrity of the lane
markings, the purpose of the statute is to promote safety on laned roadways.”109 The court noted that “[t]his interpretation is also consistent with
that given essentially identical statutes by courts that have considered this
issue.”110
As interpreted by the vast majority of courts that have addressed the
issue, lane straddling statutes “requir[e] more for violation than a momentary crossing or touching of an edge or lane line.”111 The weight of authority suggests that nominal and brief incidents of encroaching upon a traffic
control line does not constitute a violation of traffic laws. As one can imagine, without video or other tangible evidence available, alleged fog line
infractions are difficult to defend. As Professor Wilson observes, “[a] defendant who contradicts an officer’s testimony with a claim that he or she
did not cross the fog line does little more than generate images of a childhood dispute—‘Yes, you did. No, I did not. Yes, you did!’” 112 Yet more
often than not, courts give police officers more deference.
A. NINTH CIRCUIT CASES
Fog line litigation has resulted in less than consistent rulings in the
Ninth Circuit.

108. Rowe v. State, 769 A.2d 879 (Md. 2001).
109. Id. at 885.
110. Id. at 886.
111. Id. at 886; accord United States v. Freeman, 209 F.3d 464, 466 (6th Cir. 2000)
(isolated incident of car temporarily crossing the white line separating the emergency lane
from the right-hand traffic lane insufficient to support a traffic stop); United States v. Gregory, 79 F.3d 973, 978 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding that an isolated incident of a vehicle crossing
into the emergency lane of a roadway does not violate state statute’s requirement that vehicles remain entirely in a single lane “as nearly as practical”); State v. Cerny, 28 S.W. 3d 796,
800-01 (Tex. App. 2000) (holding a traffic stop invalid where the car drove on a portion of
white shoulder stripe and was weaving somewhat within its own lane of traffic); see also
Hernandez v. State, 983 S.W.2d 867, 870-71 (Tex. App.1998) (car briefly drifted into adjacent traffic lane and back); State v. Tarvin, 972 S.W. 2d 910, 912 (Tex. App. 1998) (car
drifted over the solid white line at the right-hand side of the road on two or three occasions);
Crooks v. State, 710 So. 2d 1041, 1042-43 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (car drove over the
right-hand line on the edge of the road); State v. Bello, 871 P.2d 584, 587 (Utah Ct. App.
1994) (car temporarily drifted so that it straddled both eastbound lanes of traffic).
112. See Melanie D. Wilson, “You Crossed the Fog Line!”—Kansas, Pretext, and
the Fourth Amendment, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 1179, 1191 (2010).
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1. United States v. Colin
In United States v. Colin,113 the Ninth Circuit analyzed California Vehicle Code § 21658(a) (“lane straddling”),114 which requires that drivers
“drive as nearly as practical entirely within a single lane,” and held that
police officers cannot pull over a driver for swerving unless it is pronounced and continues over a “substantial distance.”115 Defendants were
accused of twice driving in the fog lane for a prolonged period of time.116
The officers in Colin saw a driver drift to the right, let his right tires follow
the fog line for about ten seconds, and pulled the car over for possible violation of driving under the influence and lane straddling. 117 The Ninth Circuit held that the officers lacked justification for a traffic stop because the
weaving was not pronounced and did not continue over a “substantial distance.”118 Therefore, the court found the officers did not have reasonable
suspicion to effectuate a stop.119 The Colin court found that a car spending
multiple seconds in the fog lane did not constitute a violation of the statute.120
2. United States v. Delgado-Hernandez
In United States v. Delgado-Hernandez,121 the Ninth Circuit held that
Delgado-Hernandez’s crossing a fog line momentarily did not violate NRS
484.305(1) or provide officers with reasonable suspicion.122 Nevada Highway Patrol Officers spotted Delgado-Hernandez traveling within the posted
speed limit northbound on Interstate 15 at night.123 The troopers saw Delgado-Hernandez’s car wheel cross over the fog line by approximately

113.
114.

United States v. Colin, 314 F.3d 439, 446 (9th Cir. 2002).

Whenever any roadway has been divided into two or more clearly
marked lanes for traffic in one direction, the following rules apply: (a) A
vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practical entirely within a single lane
and shall not be moved from the lane until such movement can be made
with reasonable safety.
CAL. VEH. CODE § 21658(a) (1976).
115. See United States v. Colin, 314 F.3d 439, 444 (9th Cir. 2002).
116. Id. at 441.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 445-46.
119. Id.
120. United States v. Colin, 314 F.3d 439, 445-46 (9th Cir. 2002).
121. United States v. Delgado-Hernandez, No. 06-10572, 2008 WL 2485429 (9th
Cir. June 19, 2008).
122. Id. at *5.
123. Id.
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twelve to fourteen inches for a few seconds.124 Believing that he violated
NRS 484.305(1), the troopers pulled over Delgado-Hernandez’s car.125
Once the troopers explained the reason for the stop, Delgado-Hernandez
was informed that he was free to go without being cited. But because one of
the troopers suspected Delgado-Hernandez of transporting illegal narcotics,
he asked and obtained Delgado-Hernandez’s permission to search his car,
and subsequently, cocaine was found inside the trunk.126
The Court of Appeals determined that there was no evidence that Delgado-Hernandez swerved in his lane, or otherwise drove erratically.127 The
court examined the legislative intent and statutory language of NRS
484.305(1), and interpreted its primary purpose is to promote safety of multi-lane roads, and that it calls for the court to determine whether, under the
circumstances, the driver’s conduct threatened “the safety of other motorists, pedestrians or bystanders.”128 With that in mind, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Delgado-Hernandez did not place anyone in danger by momentarily crossing the fog line and did not fail to drive “ʻas nearly as practicable’ in a single lane” based on the court’s reading of the language of the
statute requiring nothing more than staying in a single lane to the degree
reasonably feasible.129
3. United States v. Wendfeldt
More recently, the district court in United States v. Wendfeldt130 granted a habeas petition based on the Nevada Highway Patrol’s unconstitutional
stop of a car traveling on Interstate 80 based on an alleged violation of NRS
484.305.131 The court concluded that (1) the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to stop Wendfeldt and (2) the stop was unnecessarily prolonged
without any reasonable suspicion after Wendfeldt refused consent.132 The
trooper told Wendfeldt that he was stopped based on alleged concerns that
Wendfeldt may have been drinking or possibly falling asleep.133 Wendfeldt
informed the trooper that he drove toward the right lane to make room for
the trooper’s patrol car in the adjacent lane.134
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Id.
Id. at *1.
Delgado-Hernandez, 2008 WL 2485429 at *2.
Id. at *4.
Id. at *5.
Id.
United States v. Wendfeldt, 58 F. Supp. 3d 1124 (D. Nev. 2014).
Id. at 1127.
Id. at 1134.
Id. at 1126.
Id. at 1127.
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After noticing the “lived in” look of Wendfeldt’s car, the trooper conducted a weapons frisk.135 When asked about any criminal history, Wendfeldt informed the trooper that he had a prior driving under the influence
charge.136 After reviewing Wendfeldt driver’s license and registration, and
running the information through dispatch, the trooper told Wendfeldt that
he was free to leave.137 But then he reinitiated questioning by asking if he
had anything illegal in the car.138 After Wendfelt refused the trooper’s request to search the car, the trooper was alerted to the areas of the passenger
door.139 Ultimately, a search warrant was obtained and a subsequent search
found methamphetamine, drug paraphernalia, and three guns.140
Referring to the NRS 484.305 violation, the court cited to DelgadoHernandez for analytical support, and reasoned that “Wenfeldt merely
touched the line, and never crossed it. . . . [His] right tires touched the fog
line several times, . . . [but not] erratically in any way, and his driving posed
no danger to any other motorists.”141
With regard to Wendfeldt’s claim that his detention was prolonged, the
court concluded that when the trooper initially stopped the car, it was not an
unreasonably lengthy traffic stop based on prior Ninth Circuit precedent.
However, the stop was unreasonably prolonged once the trooper began asking additional targeted questions regarding possible contraband after informing Wendfeldt that he was free to leave because the trooper lacked
consent, and was unsupported by additional reasonable suspicion.142
4. The Curious Case of United States v. Raileanu
In United States v. Raileanu,143 Raileanu was pulled over for an alleged violation of NRS 484B.223144 when he crossed over the fog line three
135. United States v. Wendfeldt, 58 F. Supp. 3d 1124, 1127 (D. Nev. 2014).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. United States v. Wendfeldt, 58 F. Supp. 3d 1124, 1127 (D. Nev. 2014).
140. Id. at 1127.
141. Id. at 1130.
142. Id. at 1135.
143. United States v. Raileanu, No. 2:13-CR-038-APG-PAL, 2013 WL 6913252 at
*2 (D. Nev. Dec. 30, 2013).
144. NRS 484B.223 (previously NRS 484.305) states in pertinent part:
1. If a highway has two or more clearly marked lanes for traffic traveling in one direction,
vehicles must:
(a) Be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane; and
(b) Not be moved from that lane until the driver has given the appropriate turn signal and
ascertained that such movement can be made with safety.
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 484B.233(1)(a)(b) (West 2009) (originally enacted as NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. 484.305).
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times in one-quarter of a mile.145 The court held that the officer possessed
reasonable suspicion to justify stopping Raileanu’s car. The court relied on
Whren, and reasoned that based on the totality of the circumstances, there
was an objectively reasonable basis to perform a traffic stop.146 The court
also concluded that Raileanu was not unreasonably detained because the
arresting officer asked a “reasonable number of questions designed to dispel
or confirm his suspicions about Raileanu’s conduct . . .” and the purpose of
his travel.147 Finally, the court held that Raileanu’s consent to allow a
search of his car was voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly given, and
Raileanu, a native of Moldova, had no difficulties understanding English.148
Consequently, the court adopted the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation to deny Raileanu's motion to suppress.149
Curiously, the court declined to address the alleged violation of NRS
484B.223 itself because it already concluded that Officer Bundy’s traffic
stop of Raileanu was supported by reasonable suspicion. In the eyes of the
court, it was unnecessary to decide whether there was a violation of NRS
484B.223. However, the issue of lack of reasonable suspicion necessarily
implicates the alleged violation of NRS 484B.223. As such, the court’s decision begs the question: if Raileanu was pulled over for violating NRS
484B.223, why was the judicial determination of that charge avoided? Regardless of the answer, I argue below that there was no reasonable suspicion to stop Raileanu because Officer Bundy was mistaken in his belief that
encroaching upon the fog line constituted a traffic infraction or evidence of
unsafe operation in violation of NRS 484B.223.150
Apparently, the entire prosecution was predicated on Officer Bundy’s
mistaken impression of law and an erroneous impression of the facts.151
Specifically, there was no reasonable suspicion to stop Raileanu because

145. Id. While the Nevada Supreme Court has not ruled on NRS 484B.223, the Ninth
Circuit explored it in United States v. Garcia, 205 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 2000), when deciding
whether an officer had probable cause to stop a driver. In Garcia, the officer saw the vehicle
cross into one lane and then cross back into another lane. Id. at 1184. Then, the driver
changed lanes to pass a semi-truck. As the vehicle passed the truck, the officer saw it swerve
over the center yellow line into the paved shoulder throwing dirt and debris up. Id. The
vehicle then jerked back into the previous lane. Id. Under, these circumstances the Court
found the officer had probable cause. Id. at 1187.
146. Raileanu, 2013 WL 6913252 at *22.
147. Id. at *24-26.
148. Id. at *26.
149. Id.
150. NRS 484B.223 is virtually identical to California Vehicle Code § 21658(a) at
issue in Colin.
151. This section discusses only the issue related to alleged violation of NRS
484B.223.
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Officer Bundy was mistaken in his belief that encroaching upon the fog line
constituted a traffic infraction or evidence of unsafe operation.
The facts are compelling. On January 13, 2013, Andrei Raileanu and
his pregnant girlfriend, Mila Dopca, were on their way to Utah for a winter
ski getaway when they had the misfortune of being seen by an eager Mesquite police Officer Bundy who was looking for anything to investigate.152
Officer Bundy spotted Raileanu’s 2002 Mercedes cruising eastbound on
Mesquite Boulevard, and chose to follow it as it turned into the Terrible’s
gas station parking lot.153 Based on a hunch, Officer Bundy drove around
the block and hid in a nearby trailer park to watch Raileanu and Dopca.154
Soon after, Officer Bundy followed Raileanu from Terrible’s onto the
Interstate 15 northbound ramp with the hope of finding a reason to pull him
over. But Raileanu was not speeding or driving erratically.155 Still unswayed, the determined Officer Bundy followed Raileanu for an additional
quarter of a mile before pulling over Raileanu for slightly passing over the
fog line three times, which he believed was in violation of NRS
484B.223.156 Even after Officer Bundy verified Raileanu’s and Dopca’s
Nevada state identification, and having determined that Raileanu was not
driving under the influence, he remained convinced that some unlawful
activity existed. Eventually, Officer Bundy gained entry into Raileanu’s car
and found 112 debit and/or credit cards during a subsequent search.157
In Raileanu’s motion, he argued the officer stopped him based on a
mistaken belief that crossing the fog line was a violation of NRS 484B.223.
However the court was persuaded by Officer Bundy’s testimony that criminal activity was afoot because Raileanu “quickly” turned into the gas station after the officer made “a u-turn and pulled his patrol car” outside of the
convenience store.158
Even before the unlawful traffic stop, Officer Bundy could not offer
any particularized facts to warrant an articulable, objective, and reasonable
suspicion that Raileanu or Dopca committed or were about to commit a
crime. At the evidentiary hearing, Officer Bundy testified that he observed
Raileanu’s car “touch” the fog line three times.159 His momentary and marginal touching of a fog line did not continue over a substantial distance.
152. Raileanu, 2013 WL 6913252, at *2.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Raileanu, 2013 WL 66913252, at *2.
158. Id. at *22.
159. Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing at Vol. 1, 19-20, United States v. Raileanu,
No. 2:13-CR-038-APG-PAL, 2013 WL 6913252, at *2 (D. Nev. Dec. 30, 2013) (on file with
the author).
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This alleged traffic infraction was so incidental that no citation was even
issued.
In short, Officer Bundy merely relied on his hunch. However, an officer’s hunch, even one that later turns out to be correct, does not equal reasonable suspicion.160 As the Ninth Circuit has stated in an en banc opinion,
police hunches are insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion for a
stop.161 Oftentimes, it is just a matter of law enforcement claiming that
there was reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop, involving facts likely to
be connected with criminal activity.162 But in this case, Officer Bundy had
significantly fewer factors to rely on in making his self-professed claim that
reasonable suspicion existed: (1) Raileanu made a u-turn; (2) he drove into
the Terrible’s gas station; and (3) Raileanu and Dopca explained to him that
they were going on a ski trip.163 Officer Bundy was not entitled to turn an
alleged routine traffic stop into a criminal investigation just because he had
a hunch or was otherwise unsatisfied with Raileanu’s answers to his battery

160. United States v. Mattarolo, 209 F.3d 1153 (9th Cir. 2000).
161. United States v. Gill, 280 F.3d 923 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Brown v. Texas,
443 U.S. 47 (1979) (holding that a vehicle that looks suspicious in a high crime area does
not establish reasonably articulable facts that support a vehicle stop).
162. See, e.g., United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 268-71 (2002) (defendant’s van
was driven on an unpaved remote road causing an alarm to be tripped nearby, the passengers
waved at the officers in an abnormal pattern, and the defendant stiffened up and avoided
looking at the officer before making a quick turn); Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124
(2000) (defendant was stopped in an area known for heavy drug trafficking and expected
criminal activity); United States v. Valdes-Vega, 738 F.3d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 2013) (border patrol agents stopped defendant’s truck which displayed Baja California license plates,
and was speeding “well over” 90 miles per hour and making “at least ten” erratic lane
changes without signaling); United States v. Pack, 612 F.3d 341, 345, 355 (5th Cir. 2010)
(officer detained defendant who was speeding on Interstate 30, a drug corridor, in car with
out of state license plates, who appeared nervous, and a drug-sniff dog was alerted to the
trunk); United States v. Aitoro, 446 F.3d 246, 253 n.8 (1st Cir. 2006) (defendant who made
abrupt about-face turn around on the street when police arrived and grabbed for what look
like a gun in his waistband); United States v. Miranda-Guerena, 445 F.3d 1233, 1236 (9th
Cir. 2006) (officer preformed pretextual stop based on information that defendant was involved in the sale of cocaine from his home and he was witnessed briefly visiting other
locations, and receiving short duration visits at his home); United States v. Del Vizo, 918
F.2d 821, 822 (9th Cir. 1990) (officer gained information from a tip from a confidential
informant, observed defendant quickly pull over to the curb and allowed cars to pass, made
u-turns, and circled the neighborhood, all in a “counter-surveillance” manner); United States
v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1989) (defendant was arriving from a source city for illicit
drugs, defendant traveled under an alias, and paid cash for two airplane tickets, he appeared
nervous, and he did not check his luggage).
163. Transcript of Suppression Hearing at Vol. 1, 20-22, United States v. Raileanu,
No. 2-13-CR-038-APG-PAL, 2013 WL 6913252, at *2 (D. Nev. Dec. 30, 2013) (on file with
author).
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of questions.164 The speculative nature of Bundy’s beliefs became evident at
the evidentiary hearing when he offered conjecture about Raileanu’s behavior. He testified that when Raileanu was at the gas station, he was “possibly
looking out for me . . . .”165 Officer Bundy also testified that “[a]t this time I
didn’t see whether the defendant went inside the gas station or what was
going on.”166 Officer Bundy further testified that as he was following
Raileanu onto the interstate, “[Raileanu] was possibly looking in his rearview mirror, knowing that I was following him.”167 Therefore, the stop and
164. Other courts have found Fourth Amendment violations where the police unreasonably extended the traffic stop to embark on a full criminal investigation. First, in United
States v. Digiovanni, 650 F.3d 498 (4th Cir. 2011), the defendant, traveling in a rental car,
was pulled over by a trooper for following too closely to a car in front of him. The defendant
exited the car and he provided his driver’s license and rental contract. Id. at 501. The trooper
noticed what he believed to be suggestions of drug trafficking activity: two shirts hanging in
the rear passenger compartment and a hygiene bag on the back seat, and that the interior of
the car was clean. Id. at 502. The trooper asked numerous questions concerning the defendant’s travel history and travel plans, and then turned to questioning about drug trafficking
activity. Id. at 502. The trooper asked the defendant if there was any cocaine, heroin, or
methamphetamine in the car, and received a negative response. Id. at 503. Reacting to the
trooper’s request to search the car, the defendant replied, “ʻ[i]f you want to, that’s not a
problem.’” United States v. Digiovanni, 650 F.3d 498 (4th Cir. 2011). When the defendant
was unsuccessful in opening the trunk of the car, the trooper resumed questioning concerning drug trafficking activity, even as dispatch was informing the trooper that the defendant
was not wanted on any outstanding warrants. Id. at 503. The trooper cited to these facts in
deciding to prolong the traffic stop to allow for an investigation into drug trafficking activity. Id. at 512. Eventually, the trooper obtained a written consent form and during a subsequent search, 34,091 pills of Oxycodone and $1,450 was discovered. Id. at 504. In finding a
Fourth Amendment violation, the court held that the trooper lacked reasonable suspicion to
turn the traffic stop into a drug investigation and the defendant’s consent to search of the
rental vehicle was involuntary. Second, in United States v. Beck, 140 F.3d 1129 (8th Cir.
1998), the defendant’s rental car was pulled over because he was following another vehicle
too closely. During the traffic stop, the defendant appeared nervous since his hands were
shaking and he was looking around. Id. at 1132. The officer extended the stop even after
determining that the defendant’s driver’s license was valid and that he had no criminal history. Id. at 1132. Eventually, a search of the defendant’s briefcase revealed baggies containing
methamphetamine residue. Id. at 1133. In holding that the trooper lacked reasonable suspicion to detain the defendant, the Court of Appeals rejected the discrete factors the government offered to establish that reasonable suspicion for the defendant's renewed detention and
its contention that the trooper was entitled to abandon the traffic infraction purpose of the
stop because of reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot. Id. at 1137.
165. Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing at vol. 2, 68, United States v. Raileanu, No.
2-13-CR-038-APG-PAL, 2013 WL 6913252, at *2 (D. Nev. Dec. 30, 2013) (emphasis added) (on file with the author).
166. Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing at vol. 2, 73, United States v. Raileanu, No.
2-13-CR-038-APG-PAL, 2013 WL 6913252, at *2 (D. Nev. Dec. 30, 2013) (emphasis added) (on filed with the author).
167. Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing at vol. 2, 75-76, United States v. Raileanu,
No. 2-13-CR-038-APG-PAL, 2013 WL 6913252, at *2 (D. Nev. Dec. 30, 2013) (emphasis
added) (on file with the author).
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detention of Raileanu and Dopca was unreasonable because it was based
solely upon Officer Bundy’s hunch that Raileanu had contraband in his car.
Next, Raileanu did not give consent to search his car. Whether consent
to search was voluntarily given or not is “to be determined from the totality
of all the circumstances.”168 As the record showed, Officer Bundy unreasonably detained Raileanu longer than necessary after he verified his identity. Officer Bundy admitted that after he verified Raileanu’s identification,
he had no further reason or basis to detain him. Conveniently, Officer Bundy failed to inform Raileanu of this fact.169 Raileanu was not given an option to approve or disapprove of the search because of Officer Bundy’s unrelenting and purposeful investigation.170 As a result, any consent given to
search was not an independent act of free will.
Similarly, Bundy’s extension of Raileanu’s detention was unreasonable because there were no objective facts showing Raileanu was involved in
any unlawful activity, thus no subsequent detention was warranted.171 Concerning what Officer Bundy perceived as Raileanu’s “strange behavior,”
other than Officer Bundy’s account of what transpired between he and
Raileanu, there is no evidence in the record showing that Raileanu acted
“strangely.” Raileanu acted normal. He was cooperative and answered all of
Officer Bundy’s questions, and provided consistent details about his travels.
While in United States v. Mendez,172 the Ninth Circuit held the Fourth
Amendment does not require that police conducting a routine traffic stop
have independent reasonable suspicion to ask questions that are unrelated to
the purpose of the stop or request consent to search the vehicle, provided
the interrogation does not prolong the length of the stop. It does not affect
Raileanu’s Fourth Amendment claim because the facts of this case are distinguishable.
In Mendez, two Phoenix gang enforcement officers stopped Mendez
because his car did not have a license plate or temporary registration tag. 173
While one officer conducted a records check in the car, the other officer
waited on the curb with Mendez.174 While waiting, Mendez responded to
168. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973).
169. Transcript of Suppression Hearing at vol. 1, 91, United States v. Raileanu, No.
2-13-CR-038-APG-PAL, 2013 WL 6913252, at *2 (D. Nev. Dec. 30, 2013) (on file with
author).
170. Transcript of Suppression Hearing at vol. 1, 81-82, United States v. Raileanu,
No. 2-13-CR-038-APG-PAL, 2013 WL 6913252, at *2 (D. Nev. Dec. 30, 2013) (on file with
author).
171. See Melendres v. Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990, 1001 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding police
must have reasonable suspicion criminal activity is afoot to continue a traffic stop beyond
the purpose of issuing a warning or citation for the traffic violation).
172. United States v. Mendez, 476 F.3d 1077, 1081 (9th Cir. 2007).
173. Id. at 1078.
174. Id. at 1078-79.
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questions that were prompted by officers seeing his gang tattoo, and volunteered a monologue about his gang life experience, his efforts to distance
himself from his former gang life, and his time spent in an Illinois prison
based on a weapons violation.175 When asked if he had any weapons in the
car, Mendez voluntarily admitted to having a firearm in the driver’s door
handle.176
Unlike Mendez, Raileanu did offer information that was beyond the
scope of the traffic stop, and in particular, he did not make any references to
any criminal conduct or admit that he had any contraband in his car. Both
officers in Mendez testified that the sole purpose of the stop was for “no
registration.”177 In this case, Officer Bundy watched Raileanu at the gas
station and followed him onto the interstate based solely on his hunch of
suspicious activity. While the Ninth Circuit found no prolonged delay in
Mendez, Officer Bundy unreasonably extended the traffic stop in this case.
After initiating the traffic stop and speaking to Raileanu for two minutes
and having verified his identification, he unnecessarily required Raileanu to
step out of the car into the twenty-degree weather. Raileanu was also required to submit to a pat down search even though there were no indications that he was dangerous.178 Once an officer has legitimately stopped an
individual, the officer can frisk the individual, so long as “a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his
safety or that of others was in danger.”179
Despite all of these things, the district court did not agree with such an
assessment, and after the magistrate judge denied Raileanu’s motion to
suppress, he entered a plea agreement. The court imposed a sentence of
time served (ten months), and as a result of the revocation of Raileanu’s J
Visa student status, he was deported as result of his conviction.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed Raileanu’s conviction.180 In finding that
Officer Bundy had reasonable suspicion to stop Raileanu’s car based on
Raileanu’s “counter-surveillance behavior” combined with touching the fog
line, the court noted that Raileanu’s “contrary arguments are not without
force . . . .”181 Nonetheless, in the court’s view, “the scope and duration of
the traffic stop fell within constitutional limits.”182 Raileanu, and other cas175. Id. at 1079.
176. Id.
177. Mendez, 476 F.3d at 1078-79.
178. Transcript of Suppression Hearing at vol. 1, 81-82, United States v. Raileanu,
No. 2-13-CR-038-APG-PAL, 2013 WL 6913252, at *2 (D. Nev. Dec. 30, 2013) (on file with
author).
179. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968).
180. United States v. Raileanu, No. 14-10127, 2015 WL 1787587 (9th Cir. Apr. 21,
2015).
181. Id. at *1.
182. Id.
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es factually similar to it, underscore the uses and abuses of officers in relying on a lane statute to pull over a car. In fact, it is a common practice
across the nation.
B.

OTHER CIRCUITS

In other circuits, depending on the facts of the case, there have been
equally divergent opinions. The Tenth Circuit interpreted Utah’s traffic
statute in United States v. Tang,183 and held that an officer was justified in
stopping Tang based on reasonable suspicion of violating Utah’s traffic
statute.184 The officer witnessed the dual tires on the back of his U-Haul
truck cross the right side fog line several times and the wheels rode the fog
line for 200 to 300 yards. The officer found more than one hundred marijuana plants in the truck.185 The court determined that the officer acted reasonably in believing that Tang could have been drowsy or impaired given
the considerable distance that Tang’s U-Haul crossed the fog line, and thus
concluded that the reasonable suspicion existed to support the vehicle stop
to investigate the driver’s condition.186 Likewise, in United States v. Demilia,187 the Eighth Circuit held that Arkansas’s law prohibiting the crossing
over of the fog line justified the making of a traffic stop by an Arkansas
state trooper who witnessed Demilia cross over a fog lane twice and onto
the highway shoulder.188
However, in State v. Nguyen,189 the Iowa Court of Appeals reversed
Nguyen’s conviction for operating while intoxicated because it held that
that the trooper who stopped Nguyen’s car because he came near the fog
line twice within a period of ninety seconds did not constitute sufficient
probable cause or reasonable suspicion based on Iowa’s traffic law.190 The
Court of Appeals opined, “there was no aggravated, continual, or pronounced weaving, only a ‘little bit’ of weaving . . . . Such minimal move-

183. United States v. Tang, No. 08-4179, 2009 WL 1353755, at *4-6 (10th Cir. May
15, 2009).
184. UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-61 requires drivers keep their vehicle as nearly as
practical within a single lane. UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-61 (West 2015) (renumbered as
UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6a-710).
185. Tang, 2009 WL 1353755, at *4-6.
186. Id.
187. United States v. Demilia, 771 F.3d 1051 (8th Cir. 2014).
188. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-53-302 (2015) and/or ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-51-302
(2015) (effective Aug. 1, 2001).
189. State v.Nguyen, No. 13-0045, 2013 WL 5498072 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 2, 2013).
190. Id. at *3. Under Iowa law, “[a] vehicle shall be driven as nearly a practical
entirely within a single lane and shall not moved from such lane until the driver has first
ascertained that such movement can be made with safety.” IOWA CODE § 321.306 (2015).
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ment in the lane and a momentary touching of the fog line is insufficient.”191
Further, in United States v. Alvarado-Zarza,192 the Fifth Circuit relied
on Heien’s analysis in reversing and remanding a conviction based on the
district court’s denial of a motion to suppress drugs found during a stop for
a traffic violation. The court ruled that a Texas Highway Patrol officer’s
error in initiating a traffic stop based on a Texas law requiring drivers to
signal 100 feet before turning193 was not objectively unreasonable in violation of the Fourth Amendment. After questioning Alvarado-Zarza and obtaining his consent, the patrol officer discovered cocaine in his car.194 The
court reasoned that unlike the North Carolina statute in Heien, the Texas
statute is not ambiguous, and concluded that the officer was mistaken about
the application of the 100-foot requirement because the actual distance between the signal and the turn was approximately 300 feet. The officer had
no explanation as to why he thought the distance was less than 100 feet, and
his “testimony did not provide the sort of specific, articulable facts which
would allow a court to determine that he possessed a reasonable suspicion
that Alvarado-Zarza had committed a traffic violation.”195
V. RACIAL AND IMMIGRATION IMPLICATIONS
Because the reality of modern policing illustrates that racial minorities
and immigrants are especially vulnerable for an alleged fog line violation, I
discuss several interrelated points that move beyond a strict doctrinal
Fourth Amendment analysis in this section. First, the continuing issue of
racial profiling is inextricably intertwined with immigration enforcement. 196
Too often, Latinos and other non-whites are the targets of racial profiling
by the police on the roadways.197 They are stopped based solely on their
191. Nguyen, 2013 WL 5490872 at *4.
192. United States v. Alvrdo-Zarza, 782 F.3d 246, 248 (5th Cir. 2015).
193. See id. at 249. TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 545.104(b) (2015) (“An operator
intending to turn a vehicle right or left shall signal continuously for not less than the last 100
feet of movement of the vehicle before the turn.”).
194. Alvarado-Zarza, 782 F.3d 246, 248 (5th Cir. 2015).
195. Id. at 250.
196. See ROGER G. DUNHAM & GEORGE WILSON, PREJUDICE AND RACIAL PROFILING
IN CRITICAL RACE REALISM: INTERSECTIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY, RACE, AND LAW 246 (Gregory
S. Parks et al. eds., 2008) (explaining the practice of police officers relying on race inappropriately as a criterion in professional decision-making).
197. See Kevin R. Johnson, How Racial Profiling in America Became the Law of the
Land: United States v. Brignoni-Ponce and Whren v. United States and the Need for Truly
Rebellious Lawyering, 98 GEO. L.J. 1005, 1009 (2010); Sharon L. Davies, Profiling Terror,
in THE FOURTH AMENDMENT SEARCHES AND SEIZURES: ITS CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY AND
THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATE 189 (Cynthia Lee ed., 2011) (“[R]acial profiling occurs when
an officer’s decision of whom to stop and question for suspected criminal activity proceeds
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race and subjected to differential treatment, contravening the Fourteenth
Amendment.198 Certainly, racial profiling is not a black/white phenomenon,
since Latina/os have been profiled along with African Americans in traffic
stops and other investigatory stops in the belief that they are more likely to
be involved in criminal or illicit drug related activity.199 Since September
11th, racial profiling has been broadened to include those of Middle Eastern
background,200 as well as Asians and others considered “foreign.”201
Second, the racial profiling of immigrants underscores the historical
and contemporary relationship between criminal and immigration law, and
an ever-expanding intersection between the criminal justice system and the
immigration court system. For example, many previously handled immigration violations and civil matters are increasingly addressed as criminal matters.202 Misdemeanors may result in mandatory deportation.203 The civil
immigration process and criminal process now mirror one another.204 This
phenomenon was examined in Padilla v. Kentucky,205 wherein the Court
held that constitutionally competent counsel must advise his/her client of
the potential for deportation when the immigration consequences are clear.
The plight of immigrants facing criminal prosecution was emphasized in
Justice Stevens’ majority opinion.206 Counsel cannot remain silent, and
cannot merely refer a defendant to seek advice from an immigration attorfrom the individual’s race or ethnicity itself . . . . It is the individual’s race or ethnicity that
attracts the officer’s interest or suspicion.”).
198. See Reginald T. Shuford, Any Way You Slice It: Why Racial Profiling is Wrong,
18 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 371, 376 (1999).
199. See STEVEN BENDER, GREASERS AND GRINGOS: LATINOS, LAW, AND THE
AMERICAN IMAGINATION 52 (2003); LISA MARIE CACHO, SOCIAL DEATH: RACIALIZED
RIGHTLESSNESS AND THE CRIMINALIZATION OF THE UNPROTECTED 30 (2012); see also Carol
S. Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Principles, in THE FOURTH AMENDMENT SEARCHES
AND SEIZURES: ITS CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY AND THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATE 49 (Cynthia
Lee ed., 2011) (observing that “blacks found walking in white neighborhoods, traveling on
interstate buses, or committing minor traffic offenses are much more likely to be stopped,
searched, and subjected to brutal treatment than similarly situated white people”).
200. See ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN
PROSECUTOR 116-18 (2007); Sharon L. Davies, Profiling Terror, in THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT SEARCHES AND SEIZURES: ITS CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY AND THE
CONTEMPORARY DEBATE 185 (Cynthia Lee ed., 2011).
201. See Harvey Gee, The Racial and Cultural Profiling of Asian Americans, 11
SETON HALL CONST. L. J. 78-782 (2001) (reviewing MIN ZHOU & JAMES V. GATEWOOD,
CONTEMPORARY ASIAN AMERICA: A MULTIDISCIPLINARY READER (2000)).
202. Jennifer M. Chacon, The Security Myth: Punishing Immigrants in the Name of
National Security, in GOVERNING IMMIGRATION THROUGH CRIME: A READER (Julie A.
Dowling and Jonathan Xavier Inda eds., 77 (2013)).
203. Id. at 80.
204. Id. at 80.
205. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010).
206. Id.
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ney; rather, when the immigration consequences are clear, counsel must
advise his client of those consequences.207
Third, the likelihood of deportation of undocumented immigrants after
being stopped for a traffic infraction is a real possibility. There has been a
historical high of two million deportations under the Obama Administration.208 Of those deported, 97% were Latino,209 and more than 250,000 were
Asian American.210 Since Asians, just like Latinos, have been the targets of
aggressive immigration policies such as the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA)211 and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) which make it mandatory for immigrants
with lawful permanent resident status to be removed from the United States
because of a criminal conviction.212
In addition, there has been a rise in deportations of Asian immigrants
and refugees. Since 1998, approximately 13,000 deportation orders have
been served against residents from Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. Many of
these people migrated to the U.S. as refugees after the Vietnam War without access to social services, medical care, and employment opportunities.213
Fourth, in the context of fog line stops, undocumented immigrants in
Arizona are especially susceptible to be at risk because of its large immi-

207. Id.
208. See Sahra Vang Nguyen, 5 Terrifying Facts About Undocumented Asian Americans, HUFFINGTON POST, Aug. 15, 2014, perma.cc/C9P9-WWAW; see also Adina B. Appelbaum, Note, Challenging Crimmigration: Applying Padilla Negotiation Strategies Outside
the Criminal Courtroom, 6 GEO. J.L. & MOD. CRITICAL RACE PERSP. 217, 219 (2014) (“The
Obama Administration has deported more immigrants than any previous presidential administration, with a rate double the annual average of President George W. Bush’s first term.”).
209. See Erica Person, Latinos Are Deported Disproportionately More Than Any
Other
Minority:
Report,
N.
Y.
DAILY
NEWS,
May
6,
2014,
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/latinos-deported-report-article-1.1782202.
210. See Nguyen, supra note 208.
211. In 1996, Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (“IIRIA”), Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 ( 1996). In
doing so, Congress created several new terms of art, one of which was “removal.” See Rojas-Reyes v. INS, 235 F.3d 115, 120 (2d Cir. 2000). The creation of the term “removal”
eliminated the previous legal distinction between deportation and exclusion proceedings and
merged them into one unified procedure. See United States v. Lopez-Gonzalez, 183 F.3d
933, 934 (9th Cir. 1999).
212. Elizabeth R. OuYang, Immigrants with Prior Criminal Record Risk Removal
from the United States--Impact on Asian Immigrants, 18 ASIAN AM. L.J. 157, 157-58 (2011).
213. See Kenneth Quineell, Shattering the Model Minority Myth: Mass Incarceration
and Asian and Pacific Islanders, AM. FED’N OF LABOR & CONG. OF INDUS. ORG. (May 21,
2014), perma.cc/7Q88-MA4N.

2015]

“U CAN’T TOUCH THIS”

29

grant population, and proximity to the Mexican border.214 As was the situation in Arizona v. Livingston,215 an officer could stop a car based on alleged
violation of Arizona’s lane law, which, like California and Nevada, requires
a driver to remain exclusively in a single lane “as nearly as practicable”
under the circumstances.216 The facts of Livingston are straightforward.
Livingston was not weaving or engaging in any erratic driving when the
arresting officer testified that he saw Livingston’s right side tires cross the
white shoulder line one time. After the stop, during the interactions, the
officer smelled the odor of marijuana, and eventually after obtaining Livingston’s consent, he further found over one hundred pounds of marijuana
and a large amount of cash.217 The court held that Livingston’s isolated and
minor crossing of the shoulder line of the highway was not a violation of
Arizona’s statute.218
If an undocumented immigrant or non U.S. citizen is pulled over, like
Raileanu was, they can eventually be deported if convicted of an underlying
criminal violation. Arizona’s SB 1070 heightens the risk even further. SB
1070 was signed by Governor Jan Brewer on April 23, 2010, as an attempt
to get the state to cooperate with federal immigration agencies in enforcing
federal law.219 As originally drafted, the law made it unlawful to transport
an “alien” in Arizona, and the means of transportation is subjected to immobilization or impounding.220 Law enforcement agents were also empowered “to verify a person’s immigration status in the course of ʻlawful contact’ when ʻpracticable,’ if there is ʻreasonable suspicion’ that the person is
an undocumented immigrant.”221 Litigation followed, and the case reached
the Supreme Court which invalidated most of SB 1070, but left intact parts
of the law, including a provision allowing law enforcement to arrest and
hold anyone they believe has committed a crime and they think is in the
country illegally, and hold them until their immigration status clears.222
214. See KEVIN R. JOHNSON, OPENING THE FLOODGATES: WHY AMERICA NEEDS TO
RETHINK ITS BORDERS AND IMMIGRATION LAWS 110 (2007) (discussing efforts in Arizona in
rounding up suspected undocumented immigrants found on the streets and work place).
215. Arizona v. Livingston, 75 P.3d 1103 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003).
216. Id. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-729(1) states in pertinent part: "[a] person shall
drive a vehicle as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane and shall not move the
vehicle from the lane until the driver has first ascertained that the movement can be made
with safety.” ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-729(1) (West 2015).
217. See Livingston, 75 P.3d at 1105.
218. Id.
219. See Rogelio Saenz, Arizona’s SB 1070: Setting Conditions for Violations of
Human Rights Here and Beyond, in CRIMMIGRATION: GOVERNING IMMIGRATION THROUGH
CRIME: A READER (Julie A. Dowling and Jonathan Xavier Inda eds., 165 (2013)).
220. Id.
221. Id. at 169.
222. An individual may be held indefinitely if they cannot prove their U.S. citizenship without a birth certificate, and no other country is willing to accept them. See generally
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Further, the Secure Communities program run by U.S. Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (ICE), which requires the fingerprints of all individuals booked into local jails to be sent to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Homeland Security, may not be moot depending on the outcome of the inevitable battle between the White House and
Congress over immigration reform. In 2001, President Obama called for
comprehensive immigration reform for the 21st century,223 and the Senate
passed a bill for immigration reform, but pro-immigration reform efforts
came to a halt in Congress.224 After the Republicans gained majority after
the 2014 mid-term elections, President Obama signed an Executive Order
on immigration seeking to shield up to five million people from deportation, end the Secure Communities program run by U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE), and refocus enforcement on criminals and
foreigners who pose security threats.225 However, the Executive Order will
likely meet heavy Congressional opposition.226 As a result, the future of
immigration reform remains unclear.227
Harvey Gee, Placing Limitations on the Government’s Indefinite Detention of Immigration
Detainees after Rodriguez, 17 GONZ. J. OF INT’L LAW 20 (2014). Along these same lines, an
individual may be deported if they cannot prove their U.S. citizenship derivatively. Oftentimes, the government attempts to preclude defendants from addressing the issue of derivative citizenship until the court ruled as a matter of law whether or not his claim of derivative
citizenship may be presented to the jury. Courts have ruled that the issue of derivative citizenship is certainly relevant to a §1326 prosecution. See United States v. SandovalGonzalez, 642 F. 3d 717, 724 (9th Cir. 2011) (“If he has evidence that has a tendency to
make derivative citizenship more likely, it is relevant to the issue of alienage.”); United
States v. Smith-Baltiher, 424 F.3d 913, 920-22 (9th Cir. 2005) (reversed conviction where
defendant was denied right to represent evidence of derivative citizenship); United States v.
Gracidas-Ulibary, 231 F.3d 1188, 1196-97 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (holding defendant’s
alienage is an essential element of the §1326 offense and the that government must prove its
burden with respect to that element just as it does with all others); United States v. CastroCabrera, 534 F. Supp.2d 1156, 1162 (C.D.Cal. 2008) (evidence that defendant sought to
return because his mother was dying or his cultural assimilation in the U.S. are irrelevant to
the charges and a motion in limine was granted but evidence that he may be a derivative
citizen is relevant and admissible).
223. THE WHITE HOUSE, BUILDING A 21ST CENTURY IMMIGRATION SYSTEM 3 (2011),
perma.cc/7WHB-WYS4.
224. See Laura Myers, Immigration Reform Chances Slim, Heck Says, LAS VEGAS
REV. J., June 28-29, 2014 at B1.
225. See Michael D. Shear, Obama Moves Ahead on Immigration Overhaul, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 21, 2014, at A1; A18. The Mexican American Legal Defense Fund and the
Asian American Legal Defense Education Fund support the President’s Executive Order.
See MALDEF Press Release, Nov. 20, 2014, perma.cc/H9ZM-M2QT; AALDEF Statement
on Immigration Executive Action, ASIAN AM. LEGAL DEF. & EDU. FUND (Nov. 20, 2014),
perma.cc/VN3J-ZET4.
226. See Michael D. Shear, Obama Moves Ahead on Immigration Overhaul, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 21, 2014, at A18. Michael D. Shepard et al., Obama Plan May Allow Millions
of Immigrants to Stay and Work in U.S., N. Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2014,
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VI. CONCLUSION
In sum, allowing officers to use the fog line law as a means to pull
over citizens who have done nothing illegal would be fundamentally unfair
and unjust. At any given time, ordinary drivers may be momentarily distracted by a cell phone ringing, adjusting a rearview mirror or the exterior
mirror controls, reaching for a drink or an article in the car, assisting an
infant in the back seat, or for any one of a myriad of other reasons which
could cause one of the driver’s wheels to momentarily touch a fog lane. Yet
as discussed in the previous sections, even the slightest touching allows
officers with a pretext to pull over cars, initiate contact with the driver, and
unreasonably detain the driver and ask probing questions based on what the
officer subjectively considers to be “suspicious behavior.” During this fishing expedition, the officer can then intimidate drivers further and ask as
many questions as he wants until he is satisfied. Added to this problematic
situation is the Court’s early Christmas gift to law enforcement last December in the form of Heien. The ruling is just the latest case that gives law
enforcement further leeway and practices in the context of investigations
and arrest. As a result, the already lean Fourth Amendment continues to be
cut and trimmed.228

http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/14/us/obama-immigration.html; Joe Klein, Tackling Immigration Alone, TIME, Dec. 1, 2014 at 28.
227. See David Nakamura, Immigration Reform Effectively Dead Until After Obama
Leaves Office, Both Aides Say, WASH. POST, June 26, 2014, perma.cc/Q9XK-4LK9; Zachary
A. Goldfarb & David Nakamura, Obama Pledges to Redirect Immigration Enforcement,
Conceding Defeat On Overhaul, WASH. POST, June 30, 2014, perma.cc/375M-96JN; David
Nakamura, Obama Meets With Immigration Advocates, WASH. POST, Mar. 14, 2014, perma.cc/RVN8-3TEW.
228. See, e.g., Fernandez v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1126 (2014); Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683 (2013); Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013); Florence v. Bd. Of
Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510 (2012).

